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Andrea MacGregor*

Conflicts of Interest in Self-Regulating
Health Professions Regulators

This article analyzes a set of related complaints and informal reports made to
the Nova Scotia College of Chiropractors with respect to an alleged breach of
the College’s advertising policy. This analysis assessed situational elements of
conflicts of interest in the complaint process, particularly dual roles and competing
professional interests, against the Childress et al framework of ethical public
health decision-making and the conflict-of-interest standards in the Nova Scotia
Chiropractic Act and Regulations.
The analysis concludes that the legislative scheme fails to adequately regulate
conflicts of interest and bias in the College’s disciplinary decision-making processes
through weak or unarticulated standards and high levels of discretion devolved
to the College. Conflicts of interest within complaint processes threaten patients’
health and well-being and diminish public trust in professional self-regulation. This
case study identifies a need for legislative and policy reforms to better protect
procedural justice and public accountability in health professional regulation.
Dans cet article, nous analysons un ensemble de plaintes et de rapports informels
connexes adressés au Nova Scotia College of Chiropractors (collège des
chiropraticiens de la Nouvelle Écosse) relativement à une violation présumée de
la politique du collège en matière de publicité. Cette analyse évalue les éléments
situationnels des conflits d'intérêts dans le processus de plainte, en particulier les
doubles rôles et les intérêts professionnels concurrents, par rapport au cadre de
prise de décision éthique en matière de santé publique élaboré par Childress et
aux normes relatives aux conflits d'intérêts de la Chiropractic Act and Regulations
de la Nouvelle Écosse.
L'analyse conclut que le régime législatif ne parvient pas à réglementer
adéquatement les conflits d'intérêts et la partialité dans les processus de prise de
décisions disciplinaires du collège, en raison de normes faibles ou non articulées
et des niveaux élevés de discrétion dévolus au collège. Les conflits d'intérêts
dans les processus de plainte menacent la santé et le bien-être des patients
et diminuent la confiance du public dans l'autorégulation professionnelle. Cette
étude de cas identifie un besoin de réformes législatives et politiques pour mieux
protéger la justice procédurale et la responsabilité publique dans la réglementation
des professionnels de la santé.

*
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set of regulatory complaints he made in 2018. These materials provided important support in the
development of this article’s thesis and analysis. This article’s research was carried out, in part, with
support from the Canadian Institutes of Health Research (CIHR PJT 156256). This paper was awarded
first prize for the 2020 J.S.D. Tory Award for legal writing.
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Part I
1. Introduction
A basic tenet of health professionals’ work holds that practitioners should
put the needs of patients and the public ahead of the practitioners’ own
interests.1 A central idea that flows from this is that any interest that might
conflict with this priority—that is, anything that might pose a professional
conflict of interest—should be taken seriously and avoided wherever
possible. The regulators of health professions frequently address conflicts
of interest affecting their members, including by undertaking complaint
and disciplinary proceedings. While much attention has traditionally been
given to conflicts of interest in professional practice (e.g. in a hospital or
a clinic), less has been given to conflicts that may involve the regulators
themselves (that is, within the regulators’ own administrative proceedings).
To date, it appears that no detailed analysis has been undertaken of cases
in which this type of conflict may be occurring, nor any comprehensive
discussion of the nature, scope, and potential implications of these
situations. However, instances of potential conflicts within regulators’
complaint proceedings have recently arisen and in some cases garnered
media coverage, investigation by regulators, and public concern.2
The analysis to follow initially arose from a set of advertising complaints
I made to the Nova Scotia College of Chiropractors between late 2018
and early 2019. While chiropractors and other health professionals have
lately gained scrutiny for misleading advertising related to COVID-19
treatment,3 many other health conditions have also been the subject of
advertising concerns. There has been a particular focus on advertising that
references health benefits but which may not be substantiated by scientific
evidence.4 My complaints related to practitioners’ online marketing on
the topic of childhood health conditions—marketing that I was concerned
might be misleading or harmful to patients or anyone else the advertising
might reach.
1.
Health professions’ legislation typically includes a reference to serving the public interest. See
e.g. Health Professions Act, RSBC 1996, c 183, s 16(1)(b) [BCHPA]: “It is the duty of a College at all
times to serve and protect the public, and to exercise its powers and discharge its responsibilities under
all enactments in the public interest.”
2.
See e.g. Bethany Lindsay, “Vancouver Chiropractor Resigns from College Board over Antivaccine Video” (4 May 2018), online: CBC <www.cbc.ca/news/> [perma.cc/M4UE-W39T].
3.
See Wallis Snowdon, “Cow Urine, Bleach, Oregano Oil: Medical COVID-19 Quackery Has
Big Ramifications for Public Health” (3 April 2020), online: CBC <www.cbc.ca/> [perma.cc/4GFGU4N4].
4.
See e.g. Bethany Lindsay, “There’s An Epidemic of Bogus Health Claims Online, and No Easy
Cure” (9 June 2018), online: CBC <www.cbc.ca/news/> [perma.cc/C2YE-V4VW] [Lindsay Health
Claims].
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Box 1. List of Non-Musculoskeletal Health Conditions for which
Chiropractic was Referenced as Beneficial in Children,
Tallied from Web Advertising Complaints5
Health Condition

# of Website References

ADD/ADHD

3

Allergies

1

Asthma

2

Autism

1

Bedwetting

4

Colic

10

Depression

1

Difficulty Feeding

4

Infection (Ear, Cold, Other)

9

Irritable Bowel

1

Reflux

3

Sudden Infant Death Syndrome

1

My complaints went in, and the results came back several months later:
all dismissed. This in itself was not necessarily a bad outcome. It is normally
up to health professions regulatory College staff to make determinations
about complaints as they see fit, regardless of whether the parties involved
agree with the result. However, on reviewing the full written evidence I
had collected by the end of the process, I noticed something interesting
that had little to do with the substance of the complaints themselves. Based
on the documents in front of me, it appeared as though many of the same
parties: 1) had been complained against, 2) had some degree of influence
over the complaint process, 3) had the ability to control and delete relevant
evidence prior to adjudication, 4) in most cases did control and delete
relevant evidence prior to adjudication, 5) were found not responsible for
any misconduct, and 6) had written decisions issued stating that there was
5.
While chiropractic has supporting evidence of efficacy for some musculoskeletal health conditions,
its use for non-musculoskeletal conditions, especially in pediatric populations, is controversial and has
generally been found to lack scientific support (see e.g. Canadian Pediatric Society, “Chiropractic
Care for Children: Controversies and Issues” (2002) 7:2 Paediatric Child Health 85). Some regulators,
such as the College of Chiropractors of British Columbia, have prohibited advertising that represents
chiropractic care as beneficial for childhood health conditions on the grounds that there is not enough
evidence to accurately support such claims (see College of Chiropractors of British Columbia,
Efficacy Claims (Vancouver: CCBC, 2018) s 3, online (pdf): CCBC <www.chirobc.com/> [perma.
cc/34X9-PRXJ]). I used the CCBC’s policy and examples as a guide for assessing websites in Nova
Scotia. Complaint documents are on file with the author.
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no right of appeal to any of the findings. It also appeared that this was not
the first time that something like this had occurred.
In this paper, I will seek to answer two questions about conflicts of
interest in self-regulating health professions’ complaint proceedings. First,
when and how might these conflicts occur, and what are their implications
for public health and for regulators’ mandates? Second, what can be done
to effectively address these conflicts? In order to answer these questions,
this paper has two main purposes: to identify and describe the nature
and scope of this type of conflict of interest, and to survey and evaluate
possible actions that may address this kind of conflict, particularly options
for reform.
In contrast to many jurisdictions, Canada’s professional regulation
happens mostly at the provincial level, using a model of self-regulation.6
Canadian models of professional regulation typically include less
involvement from independent parties (such as members of the public
or government bodies). Because of the differences between the standard
Canadian model and the regulatory models used elsewhere in the world,
this paper’s discussion will primarily be in the context of Canadian
provincial jurisdiction. However, some reference will be made to models
in other jurisdictions in order to compare policy responses and their
potential consequences.
This analysis draws on a variety of sources, including legal literature
and case law, as well as some sources from health disciplines and other
areas. Due to the limited number of published sources dealing with the
specific subject of administrative conflicts of interest within health
professions regulators, I will also draw from unpublished complaints made
to regulatory Colleges in Canada, including the ones I made, in order to
discuss specific cases in more detail.
This paper includes three basic parts. In the first section, I provide
background and legal context, including overviews of self-regulation and
administrative conflicts of interest. In the second section, I outline the
nature and scope of conflicts of interest in regulatory complaint processes,
with reference to specific instances where potential conflicts appear to
have arisen. I ultimately conclude that these conflicts appear not only
to contradict commonly recognized ethical principles of public health
decision-making, but also that they appear to run contrary to the purpose
of the regulator’s governing legislature. In the third section, I examine
proposals for policy reforms that may help to address these issues.
6.
See Tracey L Adams, “Self-regulating Professions: Past, Present, Future” (2017) 4 J Professions
& Organization 70 at 71, 73.
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2. Background and regulatory context
a. Overview of self-regulation in Canada
Professional regulation is intended to assure public health and safety.7 In
Canada, regulation is governed by the state, through a provincial, territorial,
or federal government authority.8 However, for most regulated occupations,
including health professions, the direct work of regulation is delegated to
a regulatory body, normally called a College, which is comprised mostly
of members of that profession. The fact that the profession is regulated
by its own members is what makes these professions “self-regulating.”
Canadian self-regulating health professions operate in a “closed” fashion:
only people who meet certain education and competence standards may be
part of the profession.9
Professional self-regulation has existed since the 19th century, but
many professions have become self-regulating more recently within the
20th and 21st centuries.10 Although the number of regulated professions
is not consistent by region, provinces and territories regulate dozens of
different health professions, and as a result, Canadian health care is mostly
delivered by members of self-regulating professions.
Just like the professions themselves, discussions of the advantages
and disadvantages of self-regulation are not new. There are several main
arguments in favour of self-regulation, including arguments relating to
administrative efficiency, necessity, economics, and health. For example,
it may be argued that self-regulation benefits governments through
increased efficiency and cost-effectiveness, and decreased administrative
burdens.11 Arguments about necessity, economic benefits, and public
health arise from the idea of a knowledge gap between the public and
health professionals. This gap, which exists due to the complexity of the
service being provided, is termed “information asymmetry.”12 The idea is
essentially that non-experts do not have enough knowledge to evaluate
the quality of health care for safety, effectiveness, or efficiency, and so

7.
See Government of Canada, “Regulated Professions and Trades” (11 January 2015), online: GC
<canadabusiness.ca> [perma.cc/T2QZ-ZADC].
8.
Ibid.
9.
See Adams, supra note 6 at 74.
10. Ibid; see also Naturopathy Act, 2007, SO 2007, c 10, Sched P.
11. See Amy Zarzeczny, “The Role of Regulation in Health Care—Professional and Institutional
Oversight” in Joanna Erdman, Vanessa Gruben & Erin Nelson, eds, Canadian Health Law and Policy,
5th ed (Toronto: LexisNexis, 2017) at 171.
12. Canada, Competition Bureau, Self-Regulated Professions: Balancing Regulation and
Competition, (Gatineau: Competition Bureau Canada, 2007) at 18, online (pdf): Competition Bureau
<www.competitionbureau.gc.ca> [perma.cc/DN6M-FKSF].
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health professionals, as experts, should be responsible for ensuring quality
standards on the public’s behalf.13
Just as Canada’s model of self-regulation has been defended, it has also
been criticized for decades. Concerns include bias (particularly in terms of
practitioners putting their interests ahead of the public interest), insufficient
transparency, and inadequate monitoring and enforcement of professional
standards.14 There is also an economic argument that self-regulation
restrains trade, sometimes in an unnecessary fashion. Additionally, healthbased arguments focus on concerns that where regulators fail to enforce
standards and the public is not protected from misconduct, members of the
public may be subjected to a range of harms.
b. Public health implications of Canadian professional regulation
model
Professional regulation can influence public health outcomes in several
ways, both through policy-based “input” regulation practices and
enforcement-based “output” practices.
The “input” based public health influence is based around professions’
ability to dictate care quality and manner of delivery. Health professions
define many of the actions and decisions available to their members, from
education and entry-to-practice standards to ethical obligations and care
standards.15 As a result, the delivery of health interventions is effectively
filtered through professional bodies by way of the standards they create
and impose on members. In this sense, professional bodies are an
important component of public health, because when the public accesses
health care, the quality and manner of delivery of that care is mediated by
the professional body that sets the standards for that care and determines
who may deliver that care.
The “output” based public health influence is based in the function of
regulators as an accountability mechanism for professionals. Regulators
have the ability to safeguard quality using several means, including
handling complaints, conducting investigations, and making disciplinary
decisions.16 Regulators are particularly instrumental in regulating
professional conduct by way of issuing orders and imposing penalties,
including fines, practice conditions, and the suspension or revocation of

13. See Roger Collier, “Professionalism: The Privilege and Burden of Self-regulation” (2012) 14
Canadian Medical Association Journal 1559 at 1559, online: <www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov> [perma.cc/
D2YV-LLKT]; Competition Bureau, supra note 12 at 19.
14. See Zarzeczny, supra note 11 at 172.
15. See ibid.
16. See ibid.
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professional registration to practice. The system is intended to protect
the public from harm or abuse by professionals. However, if it fails to
effectively monitor and regulate members' activities, the public may
be at risk of many kinds of harm: some reports of repeat behaviours by
self-regulated professionals include improperly performed procedures,
abuse, and even homicide.17 Because of the extensive role that regulators
have in health care quality and safety assurance, and the range of health
implications that their effectiveness can have for the public, it is important
that regulators serve their functions effectively.
c. Self-regulating health professions legislation and governance
As previously noted, health professions’ self-regulating bodies exist by
delegation from a provincial government authority. This is enabled through
provincial legislation and accompanying regulations, which typically define
each profession and its respective scope of practice,18 dictate the structure
of the self-regulating body,19 and grant the self-regulating body specific
governance powers and obligations.20 The structure of a self-regulating
body generally includes a governing Board composed mostly or entirely
of professional members (sometimes with a minority of non-members
appointed by government),21 and a series of professional committees to
which the Board sub-delegates its powers of practice standard creation
and enforcement. Often, the Board or Board Chair may also appoint and
remove professional committee members and Chairs.22
d. Professional complaints processes
One of the main functions of a self-regulating body is to investigate
professional complaints against members of the profession. This is
normally undertaken by committees composed of professional and lay
members who receive and process complaints, gather evidence and conduct
interviews, and make determinations about whether a member has engaged
in misconduct or failed to adhere to a standard of professional practice. In
17. See e.g. Adams, supra note 6 at 78; see also Bethany Lindsay, “Parents ‘Infuriated’ to Learn of
Past Complaints Against BC Psychologist” (26 October 2019), online: CBC <www.cbc.ca/> [perma.
cc/37UE-ZNKZ].
18. See e.g. BCHPA, supra note 1, ss 12(1), 12(2)(a)-(h) (designating titles that may be held and
health services that may be performed).
19. Ibid, ss 15(1), 15(2)(a)-(b) (establishing the College and its basic structure).
20. Ibid, ss 16(1)(a)-(b), (2)(a)-(j), 19(1)(a)-(z) (outlining the College’s obligation and power to
establish education requirements, standards of practice, and enforcement).
21. See e.g. Chiropractic Act, SNS 1999, c 4, s 7(1) [Chiropractic Act].
22. Ibid, s 46(1), 46(5); see also Nova Scotia College of Chiropractors, Board Regulations (Halifax:
NSCC, 2017), ss 7.1, 7.5, online: <www.chiropractors.ns.ca/> [perma.cc/L8ZD-LVQ2] [Board
Regulations].
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some cases, there may be a complaint investigator who receives complaints
directly; in others, complaints may be forwarded to the relevant committee
by another party such as the Registrar. Regulatory bodies (and the relevant
committees) must normally investigate any complaint brought forward by
any professional or member of the public. They may also initiate their
own investigations based on information about professional conduct that
is brought to their attention, even if it is not formally complained about.
Once an investigation is complete, a complaint may be dismissed or
referred to a disciplinary committee, which may in turn impose warnings
or penalties to members who are found to have contravened a professional
standard.23
A central feature of self-regulating professions’ governance is that
most professional members of each regulator are also practicing members
of the profession—that is, they provide health care to patients, and they
also work within the regulatory body to create or enforce professional
standards. A critical implication of this, for the purpose of this paper’s
discussion, is that any professional member of any regulatory body may
potentially be subject to a professional complaint, in addition to having
an ongoing role in the complaint management process. This can lead
to professionals having a dual role, acting both as a potential enforcer
of standards and as a party against whom standards may potentially be
enforced.
3. Conflicts of interest in the context of professional self-regulation
The legal and health care fields have each developed their own conceptions
of conflicts of interest. The approaches are similar and overlap in some
respects, and both are relevant to a health professions regulator, which
functions as part of the legal system and as part of the health care system.
a. Conflicts of interest in the context of health professions ethics  
In the context of health care, a conflict of interest has been defined as “a
set of conditions in which professional judgment concerning a primary
interest (such as a patient’s welfare...) tends to be unduly influenced by a
secondary interest (such as financial gain).”24 One of the specific health
implications of a conflict of interest is that it may have a negative impact
on patient care.25

23. See e.g. Ontario College of Pharmacists, “Complaints Process,” online: OCP <www.ocpinfo.
com/> [perma.cc/5Z5W-DK3Y].
24. Dennis F Thompson, “Understanding Financial Conflicts of Interest” (1993) 329 N Engl J Med
573 at 575, online: NEJM <www.nejm.org> [perma.cc/8DQH-HC46].
25. Ibid at 574.
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Canadian self-regulating bodies have generally adopted similar
conflict of interest definitions in their own College rules, often making
reference to the best interests of patients. Colleges typically recognize
conflicts of interest within a clinical setting as a form of professional
misconduct.26 Regulatory Colleges’ conflict of interest rules often apply to
a range of situations, including business referrals, product sales, or matters
involving monetary or personal interests. Some College Boards also have
specific guidelines outlining procedures for addressing conflicts of interest
affecting Board and committee members carrying out College functions.27
The governing legislation of self-regulators sometimes references conflicts
of interest as well, typically with a focus on conflicts that may directly
affect patient care.28
b. Conflicts of interest in the common law context
In instances where a conflict of interest occurs within an administrative body
like a health professions regulator, common law principles of procedural
fairness that address conflicts of interest and bias are engaged. These
principles are well-recognized and ordinarily apply to any administrative
decisions made by staff within a regulator, unless a statute clearly provides
otherwise.
One main issue that arises where registrants have influence over
complaint processes in which they also have a professional interest is the
potential for financial conflicts of interest. It has been recognized that where
an adjudicator (or someone connected to the adjudicator) may benefit or
suffer financially from a decision, bias is presumed,29 and the adjudicator
should typically be disqualified from taking part in the decision.30 This
is directly relevant to regulatory complaints processes, where complaints
against registrants may have consequences that affect registrants’ finances
directly (via monetary penalties) or indirectly (via impacts on professional
reputation or ability to practice). Given the range of possible disciplinary

26.
See Debra LC Zelisko, Managing Conflict Of Interest In Healthcare: The Roles Of
Professionalism And Regulatory Colleges (PhD Dissertation, University of Toronto, 2015) at 72-73
[unpublished], online: U of T <tspace.library.utoronto.ca> [https://perma.cc/HTZ5-HGMY] (noting
several Ontario Colleges defining COIs as professional misconduct).
27. See e.g. College of Physicians and Surgeons of Saskatchewan, “Governance Policy: GP-10
Conflict of Interest” (19 January 2018), online: CPSS <www.cps.sk.ca/> [https://perma.cc/G66U4Z9N].
28. See e.g. College of Registered Nurses of Alberta, Bylaws (revised September 2019) s 36.5,
online (pdf): CARNA <nurses.ab.ca/> [perma.cc/PS62-ZUKY].
29. See Sara Blake, “Discretion and Bias” in Administrative Law in Canada, 6th Ed (Toronto:
LexisNexis, 2017) at 121.
30. See David J Mullan, Administrative Law, 3rd Ed, (Toronto: Carswell, 1996) at 293.
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sanctions, from fines to de-registration,31 and the possibility of decisions
against registrants being made public,32 a registrant’s livelihood may be
affected by the outcome of a complaint, resulting in a financial conflict.
As a result, any practising registrant with influence over any part of
their own complaint process will presumably have a financial stake in the
outcome of that process, and as a result would presumably be unable to
participate as an impartial decision-maker. This conflict would most clearly
affect registrants serving on complaints or disciplinary committees, who
have direct power to determine the outcome of a complaint. However, it
could also affect other members of the regulatory body, including executive
and Board members who have complaints made against them. This is
because some of these members may potentially serve on the committees
at the time the complaints are made, and these registrants often have the
ability to decide whether to proceed with the complaint, make disciplinary
decisions regarding the complaint, or control which members serve on
committees that process complaints.
The second issue underlying potential conflicts is the dual role that
can arise where parties subjected to complaints also have decision-making
roles connected to the complaint process. One type of dual role that may
undermine procedural fairness is when a party can be both a defendant
and a formal adjudicator (or investigator) in a complaint process. Where
regulatory tribunals are concerned, it has been recognized that members
should not judge complaints against themselves or preside over hearings if
they have been involved in the matter being heard.33 Such a dual function is
normally treated as an inherent conflict of interest. An exception to this is
cases where dual roles have been authorized by statute.34 However, statutes
generally authorize an overlap between investigatory and adjudicatory
roles, and not an overlap between being a party and being an investigator
or a judge. Such an overlap would also be contrary to longstanding,
fundamental procedural fairness principles: for example, an early Quebec
Court of Appeal case regarding the province’s College of Dental Surgeons
stated that the possibility of a dual plaintiff-judge or defendant-judge
role was “not even open for discussion.”35 This is particularly relevant to
formal investigations undertaken by a regulator, where an Investigation
31. See e.g. Chiropractic Act, supra note 21, s 60(2)(e)(i).
32. Ibid, s 88(1), (2).
33. See Blake, supra note 29 at 121, citing Great Atlantic and Pacific Co of Canada Ltd v Ontario
(Human Rights Commission), [1993] 13 OR (3d) 824, 109 DLR (4th) 214 (ONSC); Griffin v
Summerside (City) Director of Police Services, [1998] PEIJ No 30 at para 34, 159 DLR (4th) 698
(PEISC).
34. See Blake, supra note 29 at 121.
35. Maillet v College of Dental Surgeons (1921), 58 DLR 210 at 211, 34 CCC 138 (Que CA).
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Committee may have at least two practising registrants and one member
who is not a member of the profession—a situation that may allow for
a majority of Committee members to potentially be in a dual-role if a
complaint is ever made against them.36 		
Another type of dual role can arise from less formal administrative
roles, i.e. decisions that fall outside the formal complaint process. Beyond
formal hearings or investigations, decision-making roles within any stage
of the complaint process may give rise to a conflict affecting procedural
fairness in cases where a decision-maker has a competing personal or
professional interest. This can include the stage of deciding whether
to forward a complaint for investigation, or whether and how to gather
and handle evidence. In Baker v Canada, a leading decision regarding
procedural fairness, the Supreme Court of Canada recognized that the level
of importance of a decision on the lives of those affected is a significant
factor in determining a duty of procedural fairness.37 Where the level of
importance is higher, the level of fairness required will also increase.
Administrative decisions that may ultimately start, finish, or affect the
course of a complaint would seem to have a high level of importance. This
is in part because they may lead to significant professional consequences,
which the court in Baker used as an example of a situation in which a high
standard of fairness is required (specifically referencing a professional
disciplinary decision, in the form of a suspension).38 At the same time,
decisions about investigations may also affect the lives of complainants
and the public, as concerns about health professionals will often be related
to health or safety. Both sets of impacts would probably have a high level of
personal importance for affected individuals, one that attracts a significant
duty of procedural fairness that a dual-role conflict would undermine.
Part II
1. Scope and description of conflicts within regulators
This section provides a basic account of the nature and potential
implications of cases in which members of self-regulating bodies appear
to have control over, or involvement in, the decision-making processes
regarding complaints against themselves. It begins with an overview of
instances in which these types of conflicts appear to have arisen. Following

36. Chiropractic Act, supra note 21, s 46(1)–(3).
37. See Baker v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 1999 CanLII 699 (SCC) at para
25, [1999] 2 SCR 817.
38. Ibid at para 25, citing Kane v Board of Governors of the University of British Columbia, 1980
CanLII 10 (SCC), [1980] 1 SCR 1105 at 1113.
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this will be a discussion of the ethical and legal considerations that may
apply to such cases.
a. Sources suggesting extent of conflicts within regulators  
The existing evidence around possible conflicts of interest affecting health
professions regulators has largely been centered around practitioners’
advertising practices, possibly because these practices are more publicly
visible (and therefore more likely to be reported). Canada’s health
professions regulators typically have advertising policies requiring that all
information contained in their registrants’ marketing should be accurate
and verifiable.39 However, research suggests that in self-regulating
professions across many provinces, a large percentage of practitioners
(or even a majority in some cases) may be making factually unsupported
health claims online,40 potentially in violation of their regulatory Colleges’
advertising policies.
There has been a particularly large number of reports of this issue
occurring in professions associated with Complementary and Alternative
Medicine (CAM). Some experts have cited the lack of a strong evidentiary
basis behind many CAM practices, as well as the common use of CAM
by those who are distrustful of conventional medical practices, as reasons
why factually unsupported health in this area may be more common.41
However, concerns about misleading advertising also exist across more
mainstream health professions.42
Because it is common for professional Board and committee
members (i.e. governing members) to be actively practising members of
their profession, and because most practising members advertise their
services, it is perhaps unsurprising that governing members of Colleges
have sometimes been implicated in advertising complaints. For example,
one governing member of the College of Chiropractors of Ontario
39. See e.g. Nova Scotia College of Chiropractors, Board Policy: Advertising (Halifax: NSCC,
2019) s 4, online (pdf): NSCC <drive.google.com/> [perma.cc/7ELX-L8ZN] [NSCC Ad Policy]; see
also College of Physiotherapists of Ontario, Advertising Standard (Toronto: CPTO, 2019), online:
CPTO <www.collegept.org/> [perma.cc/ER3Q-CUY9]; College of Dietitians of Alberta, Code of
Ethics (Edmonton: CDA, 2008) ss 3.5, 3.7, online (pdf): CDA <collegeofdietitians.ab.ca/> [perma.
cc/2HDW-R82D].
40. See e.g. Blake Murdoch, Stuart Carr & Timothy Caulfield, “Selling Falsehoods? A CrossSectional Study of Canadian Naturopathy, Homeopathy, Chiropractic and Acupuncture Clinic Website
Claims Relating to Allergy and Asthma” (2016) 6:12 BMJ, online: BMJ <bmjopen.bmj.com/>
[perma.cc/7AJM-R8DT]; see also Timothy Caulfield & Christen Rachul, “Supported by Science?:
What Canadian Naturopaths Advertise to the Public” (2011) 7:14 AACI 7 at 7, online: NCBI <www.
ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/> [perma.cc/6UY2-VPWM].
41. See e.g. Lindsay Health Claims, supra note 4.
42. Ibid; see also Leanne Loranger, “Good Practice: Are you Selling Snake Oil?” (30 April 2015),
online: CPTA <www.physiotherapyalberta.ca/> [perma.cc/29WJ-FXD6].
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was subject to a complaint about anti-vaccination statements in 2019.
Although she lost her seat on the College council in an election shortly
afterward, multiple other members of the College who had also made antivaccination statements remained on the council,43 and as of July 2020, no
disciplinary action regarding the complaint has been reported.44 A similar
issue of potential conflicts of interest arose when I made a set of informal
reports to the College of Naturopaths of British Columbia (CNBC) about
practitioners advertising alternative therapies for cancer.45 At the time
the reports were sent, four of the College members I reported were listed
as being on the CNBC Board, and one member was listed as serving on
the College’s Discipline Committee.46 In some cases, it is professionals
themselves who come forward with allegations that their regulatory
Colleges are not adequately enforcing advertising standards, or that
governing members of Colleges may not be following the standards. For
example, members of the British Columbia Chiropractic Association,
a voluntary professional body, reportedly complained to the College of
Chiropractors of British Columbia over a two-year period about antivaccine content posted by their fellow registrants online, including
postings by one registrant who was the College’s Vice Chair at the time.47
The high prevalence of misleading advertising among practising
members of health professions, in combination with the high prevalence of
governing members being practising members, suggests that there may be
potential for widespread conflicts of interest within many self-regulatory
bodies across Canada, since many professionals may be engaging in at
least one practice (misleading advertising) that may contravene the same
policies the professionals are responsible for enforcing. If Colleges are
charged with enforcing policies against members, but governing members

43. National Post, “As One Anti-Vaccination Sympathizer is Voted off Ontario’s Chiropractic
Regulatory Body, Another is Voted on” (16 April 2019), online: National Post <nationalpost.com/>
[perma.cc/V7HW-T8FG].
44. See College of Chiropractors of Ontario, “Discipline Hearings and Decisions,” online: <www.
cco.on.ca/> [perma.cc/3PN4-GUZ2].
45. See Letter from Andrea MacGregor to the College of Naturopathic Physicians of British
Columbia (5 February 2019), titled “Advertising Concerns: Online Claims Regarding Cancer
Treatment and Screening” [unpublished].
46. See College of Naturopathic Physicians of British Columbia, Board, online: Wayback Machine
<web.archive.org/>; College of Naturopathic Physicians of British Columbia, Committees, online:
Wayback Machine <web.archive.org/> (showing the members of the Board and the Discipline
Committee in February 2019).
47. See Bethany Lindsay, “Ministry Considered Options for Handling ‘Dysfunctional’ Chiropractors
College after CBC Report, FOI Shows” (18 March 2019), online: CBC <www.cbc.ca/> [perma.cc/
D76Y-7FZ3].
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of the College are violating those same policies, the College’s interest in
policy enforcement may be substantially undermined.
b. Overview of specific instances of potential conflicts: N.S. College of
Chiropractors
In November 2018, the Nova Scotia College of Chiropractors President
and Board Chair were named in a set of complaints alleging that some
College members were contravening advertising policies by sharing antivaccine content online. According to the complainant, the College had not
taken any disciplinary action as of December 2018, and no notice of any
decision has been published on the College’s disciplinary webpage as of
the date of this paper’s submission.48
My own complaints were also in relation to registrants’ advertising
practices. After hearing of the initial anti-vaccine advertising complaints,
I compiled a survey of College registrants’ online advertising practices
in relation to childhood health conditions. This survey revealed that
nearly 25% of practitioners registered with the College had a website
that contained at least one reference to chiropractic being beneficial to
non-musculoskeletal childhood health conditions (such as ADHD, colic,
autism, or ear infections). The wording of these references was often
similar or identical across multiple practitioners’ websites. According to
health experts, there is insufficient scientific evidence to support these
statements about childhood conditions,49 and chiropractic regulators
in other jurisdictions, including British Columbia, have made explicit
policies prohibiting the use of these representations in their practitioners’
advertising.50 However, the Nova Scotia Chiropractic College has not
adopted this rule (although the College does have an advertising policy
requiring that advertising claims be accurate and verifiable).51 In addition
to the practitioners whose websites contained childhood conditions
references, another 15% of practitioners claimed to perform treatments
for babies or infants. This claim itself is not misleading, but it has been
described by medical experts as potentially unsafe and also unlikely to be
48. See Letter from Rory Williams to the Nova Scotia Minister of Health (9 December 2018)
[unpublished]; Nova Scotia College of Chiropractors, Disciplinary Findings, online: NSCC <www.
chiropractors.ns.ca/> [perma.cc/Q26Y-YDTZ].
49. See e.g. Sharon Kirkey, “Pediatricians Alarmed by Chiropractic Treatments for Babies That
‘Border on the Fraudulent’” (8 May 2018), online: National Post <nationalpost.com/> [perma.
cc/4T49-XV4M]; see also Samuel Homola, “Pediatric Chiropractic Care: The Subluxation Question
and Referral Risk” (2016) 30:2 Bioethics 63 at 63, online: Wiley <onlinelibrary.wiley.com/> [perma.
cc/FWY7-TZ8F].
50. See College of Chiropractors of British Columbia, Efficacy Claims (Vancouver: CCBC 2018) s
3, online (pdf): CCBC <www.chirobc.com/> [perma.cc/34X9-PRXJ].
51. See NSCC Ad Policy, supra note 39.
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of medical benefit, and as such, it may engage concerns about safety and
about the promotion of unnecessary treatment, even if it is not explicitly
addressed in College standards.52
In total, 41 practitioners had websites with representations about
childhood health conditions, and 26 additional practitioners did not
reference childhood conditions but claimed to treat babies or infants.
Initially, all practitioners and websites were reported to the College
informally in December of 2018.53 The College’s original response was
to decline to investigate.54 The College did not give any reasons for its
decision not to begin an investigation or otherwise act on the reports,
stating that it was under no duty to give reasons. However, the College did
state that to have the complaints investigated, each complaint would need
to be filed formally using a standardized complaint template. The template
requires a complainant to state their full name, address, and other contact
information, and to provide a description of the nature of the complaint
(which can include any written or visual evidence the complainant would
like to rely on). The form states that all of this information is forwarded
to every party who is complained against.55 The College confirmed that
this is the case even for the complaints at hand, which were based entirely
on publicly available website information, where the complainant would
not be needed for the purpose of testimony, and where the complainant’s
personal information would not be relevant to the outcome of the decision.56
Following this response, any websites that still contained childhood
condition references were formally reported in March of 2019 (for a total
of 19 formal complaints against 18 practitioners, as some practitioners
shared a single website and other websites had since been modified to
remove the references).57 The practitioners whose websites were formally
complained against included three of eight professional members of the
College Board (including the Board Chair), as well as one of two members
who served as Chairs of the Investigative Committee during the time the
complaints were active.58
52. See Kirkey, supra note 49; Homola, supra note 49 at 63.
53. See Letter from Andrea MacGregor to the Nova Scotia College of Chiropractors (12 December
2018) titled “Online Advertising Complaint” [unpublished] [Ad Complaint].
54. See Letter from the Nova Scotia College of Chiropractors to Andrea MacGregor (3 January
2019) titled “Complaint N SCC 4.6.59 Andrea McGregor” [sic] [unpublished].
55. See Nova Scotia College of Chiropractors, “Complaint Form/Authorization and Consent to
Investigate” at 4, online (pdf): NSCC <drive.google.com/> [perma.cc/T4PG-PZCS].
56. See Letter from the Nova Scotia College of Chiropractors to Andrea MacGregor (4 March 2019)
titled “Complaint NSCC 4.6.59 Andrea McGregor” [sic] [unpublished].
57. See Message from Andrea MacGregor to the Nova Scotia College of Chiropractors (27 March
2019) reply to “Complaint N SCC 4.6.59 Andrea McGregor” [sic] [unpublished].
58. See Nova Scotia College of Chiropractors, The Board of the Nova Scotia College of
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Importantly, the Board Chair has the ability to appoint, grant powers to,
and repeal the Chairs of the Investigative Committee (which investigates
complaints) and the Hearing Committee (which carries out hearings and
disciplinary decisions).59 An additional Board member and Investigative
Committee Chair had also originally been named in the informal reports
that were not investigated.60 The Board collectively has the power to
appoint the members of the Investigation Committee, and a majority of
people on the Investigative and Hearing Committees may also be current
or former Board members.61 In total, seven of ten governing members of
the College who were known to have a connection to the complaint process
had a website that was subject to a formal complaint or an informal report.
Of particular note is that six of the ten governing members had websites
that were subject to complaints or informal reports about the same subject
matter (advertising references about childhood conditions). This means
that most of the College’s governing members who were known either to
be involved in the complaints process,62 or to have the power to decide
who could be involved in the complaints process, had their own websites
subjected to a formal complaint or informal report about the same subject
matter as one another.
Each registrant who received a complaint responded in writing in
April of 2019. In June and July of 2019, the College issued decisions for
each formal complaint, opting to dismiss all of them. In a majority of
cases,63 according to the College, the online material in question had been
removed from the websites by the time investigators attempted to review
it, resulting in the College being unable to review the material. The College
then found insufficient evidence for any finding of professional misconduct
or adjudication by a Hearing Committee. (This was notwithstanding that
Chiropractors, online: NSCC <www.chiropractors.ns.ca/> [perma.cc/96GP-K5LP] (listing the College
Board members) [NSCC Board]; NSCC, Cover Letter and Decision 4.6.68; 4.6.70; 4.6.75; 4.6.77
[unpublished] (noting the reported websites with which the members and Investigation Committee
Chairs were associated); Chiropractic Nova Scotia, Directory [a collection of Directory weblinks is on
file with the author] (showing that the same members listed on the Board page are the operators of the
websites listed in decision numbers 68, 70, 75, and 77, respectively).
59. See Board Regulations, supra note 22, ss 7.1, 7.2, 7.4, 7.5.
60. See Ad Complaint, supra note 53 (included reports against websites associated with Investigative
Committee Chair and Board member); Chiropractic Nova Scotia, Directory [a collection of Directory
weblinks is on file with the author] (showing that the members are the operators of the websites listed
in the reports).
61. Chiropractic Act, supra note 21, ss 46(1)–(3), 52(3).
62. See NSCC Board, supra note 58 (“The Board governs, controls and administers the regulatory and
administrative affairs of the College... The Board’s functions include... complaints and investigation”).
63. Thirteen of nineteen cases contained similar statements: NSCC, Cover Letter and Decision
4.6.62; 4.6.63; 4.6.65; 4.6.66; 4.6.67; 4.6.68; 4.6.73; 4.6.74; 4.6.75; 4.6.76; 4.6.77; 4.6.78; 4.6.80
(2019) [unpublished] [NSCC Decisions].
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dated screenshots from the websites had been provided in the complaints,
and that in some instances, the original webpages are still visible in public
web archives.)64 Two follow-up surveys in August and October of 2019
found that most references captured in the original complaint screenshots
were no longer displayed on the websites. However, 15 practitioners whose
advertising was reported had not removed the original references, and
another seven practitioners had removed material that had been captured in
reported screenshots but still had other online content referencing childhood
conditions. As of the time of this paper’s submission, approximately 10%
of the province’s practitioners still appear to be representing on their
websites that chiropractic may benefit childhood conditions.65
Following the final outcomes of the reports and complaints, the College
and Investigative Committee did not at any point state that registrants
should not represent that chiropractic may be beneficial for childhood
health conditions, although some decisions stated that registrants should
not expressly claim to treat or cure childhood health conditions.
2. Discussion of issues raised
a. Childress framework and ethical concerns relating to the public
interest
Professional ethics is an important aspect of health professions generally,
but it is particularly relevant to discuss here because ethical considerations
are often a feature of health professions legislation, with conflicts of
interest being a common kind of ethical concern within health professions.
The Chiropractic Act includes several mentions of ethics generally, and
conflicts of interest specifically. Section 4(3) of the Act states that “In order
that the public interest may be served and protected, the objects of the
College are to... establish, maintain and develop standards of professional
ethics among its members.”66 Section 3(a) of the Regulations further notes
that “professional misconduct” includes “a breach of the Act, regulations
or by-laws of the Council,”67 which can include ethical standards. The
Regulations, By-laws, and College standards include a Regulation
addressing corporation conflicts of interest and undertakings contrary to
ethical practice,68 a By-law regarding Board conflicts of interest,69 and a
64. Example weblinks are on file with the author.
65. A survey and collection of weblinks are on file with the author.
66. See Chiropractic Act, supra note 21, s 4(3)(a).
67. NS Reg 130/2001, s 3(a).
68. NS Reg 130/2001, s 32.
69. See NSCC, Board Policy: Conflict of Interest (Halifax: NSCC, 2009), online (pdf): NSCC
<www.chiropractors.ns.ca/> [perma.cc/8XUM-VZUS].
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professional Code of Ethics (which has previously been treated as a source
of misconduct findings by the College).70 These examples show that ethics
and conflicts of interest are an important concern embedded within the
College’s governing statutes and practices, and the decisions of its staff
must be considered in light of this.
Accordingly, this section discusses the ethical implications of the
College’s decisions, with reference to the public health decision-making
framework outlined by James Childress et al,71 which has been described
by other ethics scholars as “the state of the art in the field.”72 The framework
generally looks first to the moral concerns raised in a particular situation,
and then to any justificatory considerations that may apply where moral
concerns appear to be infringed.73 This section looks at the possible moral
concerns and justifications relevant to the cases at hand, including any
potential justificatory problems.
A central idea underpinning the Childress framework is that of public
trust and accountability. According to the authors, “Public accountability
requires an openness to public deliberation and imposes an obligation
on decision-makers to provide honest information and justifications for
their decisions.”74 Public accountability should, at a minimum, involve
transparently seeking information from affected parties and disclosing
relevant information publicly in order to maintain public trust.75
i. Moral concerns raised  
The cases set out above raise several moral concerns outlined in the
framework. The first is a privacy concern. The only manner in which
members of the public could ensure their concerns are investigated would
be to have their full names and contact information be automatically
forwarded to all parties complained against. This would result in the
disclosure of their personal information to numerous adverse parties,
potentially infringing the complainants’ information privacy. The second
concern engaged is harm avoidance. Since the concerns in question
involved potential misconduct, the cases involve a risk of misconduct going
unchecked if the concerns are not acted upon by the College, potentially
70. See Nova Scotia College of Chiropractors and Dena Churchill (Notice of Hearing) (1 Nov 2018)
(NSCC), online (pdf): NSCC <www.chiropractors.ns.ca/> [perma.cc/XWA8-HWKP].
71. See James E Childress et al, “Public Health Ethics: Mapping the Terrain” (2002) 30:2 JL Med &
Ethics 170.
72. See Kalle Grill & Angus Dawson, “Ethical Frameworks in Public Health Decision-Making:
Defending a Value-Based and Pluralist Approach” (2015) 25:4 Health Care Analysis 291 at 291,
online: Springer <link.springer.com/article/> [perma.cc/MCY2-YLZU].
73. See Childress, supra note 71 at 173.
74. See ibid at 175.
75. See ibid.
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resulting in public harm. The third major concern is one of distributive
justice, which entails a fair distribution of benefits and burdens among
affected parties. This concern may be infringed if a member of the public
must commit time, resources, and personal information to bringing an
already publicly visible matter forward to the College. This process may
be intimidating and burdensome for complainants.
ii. Justificatory conditions  
Having identified concerns that may be have been infringed by the
decisions underlying the College investigation process, the discussion will
now move to a consideration of the possible justifications for potentially
infringing decisions, both in terms of the formal complaints and informal
concerns involved. The justifications put forward by Childress et al,
which will be discussed in turn, include considerations of a decision’s
effectiveness, proportionality, necessity, least infringement, transparency,
and public accountability.
Effectiveness and proportionality  
According to the Childress framework, decisions must be assessed for
effectiveness, and “it is essential to show that infringing one or more general
moral considerations will probably protect public health.”76 Additionally,
the positive effects of the decision should outweigh the negative effects.
Relevance to formal complaints
The concern of harm reduction is relevant here, since the complaints
revolved around an activity that was alleged to be harmful to the public by
way of deception. The College’s apparent action of not gathering its own
evidence from the websites before informing the website owners of the
investigation (resulting in the deletion of text evidence) raises questions
of effectiveness. The College suggested in some of its final decisions that
the complainant’s evidence alone was insufficient for a full assessment
of the online communications as they appeared prior to removal,77 but
the College appeared to preserve no other evidence in these cases. From
the College’s perspective, there may be a reasonable argument that these
decisions were effective because any potentially harmful online text is no
longer visible to the public, and the risk of harm that may come from a lack
of determination about the original text is outweighed by the conservation
of College resources that may also be needed for other public-interest
activities. However, these positive effects may not outweigh the level
76.
77.

See ibid at 173.
See e.g. NSCC, Cover Letter and Decision 4.6.62; 4.6.65 [unpublished].
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of harm that could ensue if the text was indeed harmful and might be
reposted due to a lack of disciplinary action or other intervention, as well
as the fact that the investigation may not appear to have been thorough
from the public’s perspective.
Relevance to informal concerns
In terms of harm reduction concerns, it is not clear how declining to
investigate without issuing reasons was beneficial to the public. This
is especially true in light of the fact that some of the text the College
initially declined to investigate was eventually found to be problematic
by the College following a subsequent formal investigation. It could be
argued that the decision not to investigate the concerns was again based
on a consideration of resource efficiency. However, without reasons being
issued, it is unclear how the potential costs and benefits of declining to
investigate were evaluated. As a result, the effectiveness and proportionality
of the decision with respect to public health appears doubtful.
Necessity and least infringement
Where a decision infringes a moral consideration, it is important to be
able to show that the decision was necessary, and that there was no lessinfringing alternative available.
Relevance to formal complaints
With respect to privacy and distributive justice concerns, it is unclear why
a complainant’s personal information would need to be forwarded to all
parties complained against and why repeatedly submitting the College’s
complaint form against each individual practitioner would be the only
acceptable format. This is especially the case given that forwarding
personal contact information to defendant registrants is not required
under the Nova Scotia Chiropractic Act, and regulatory Colleges in other
provinces have accepted confidential reports that were written in various
formats and did not require a complainant’s contact information to be
disclosed to every potential defendant.78 This alternative would seemingly
be less infringing of a complainant’s personal privacy, and potentially a
more efficient means of accepting reported concerns.
Relevance to informal reports
Without reasons being issued, it is unclear whether the College considered
any alternatives to disregarding the informal concerns. The College noted
that the Chiropractic Act does not enumerate any factors that must be
78. See e.g. Letter from the College of Chiropractors of British Columbia to Andrea MacGregor (30
November 2018) [unpublished].
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considered when the Registrar or Investigative Committee are deciding
on a discretionary basis about whether to investigate an informal report.
Despite this lack of guidance, some alternative strategies may have been
possible. The College of Chiropractors of British Columbia acted on
informally reported concerns regarding its own registrants, ultimately
giving some practitioners informal warnings about their content without
carrying out a full investigation.79 This alternative strategy would seem
to strike a balance between resource constraint considerations and the
need to ensure that practitioners are following professional standards. It is
unclear why this, or another alternative, was not chosen.
Public accountability and transparency
Where public accountability may be employed to justify a decision,
the importance of honest information and justification is heightened.80
Transparency as an aspect of accountability is highly relevant in this
situation, where a College has decided to decline first to investigate, and
then to discipline, its own members.
Relevance to formal complaints
In the case of the formal complaints, the College’s written decisions
could arguably be considered appropriately transparent in a situation
where possible harm to the public is being considered. However, the
reasons did not address any potential conflicts among staff who acted on
the complaints. As a result, it is unclear how conflicts were addressed
and whether they were addressed effectively. In particular, it is unclear
whether the complaint-processing members’ advance knowledge of the
complaints against themselves had any bearing on the decision to allow
members to delete textual evidence before the evidence was reviewed.
Without a transparent explanation for these decisions, it may appear that
members were allowed to act on “inside knowledge” about the complaints
by deleting evidence and avoiding potential penalties that might ensue
from a later investigation.
Relevance to informal reports
In the case of the informal reports, there was no written explanation for
the decision not to investigate. The College’s position was that the choice
to take no action did not constitute a decision at all, and so no written
justification was needed. Given that the reports were informal, the choice
79. See e.g. Bethany Lindsay, “College Registrar Says ‘I won’t Hesitate’ to File Complaints on
Chiropractors’ False Claims” (10 November 2018), online: CBC <www.cbc.ca/> [perma.cc/F4HLYD67].
80. See Childress, supra note 71 at 175.
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not to investigate may indeed be considered an informal choice, rather
than a formal decision in the traditional sense. However, the fact that there
was concern about public harm, and that a formal report would not give the
College any additional relevant information, and that there were possible
conflicts of interest that could later be discovered, supports a higher level
of transparency. Without written reasons and the ability to appeal, the
situation could give the impression that the College could reject a report
without any clear rationale.
b. Statutory interpretation concerns relating to the public interest
In addition to the ethical concerns outlined above, these cases raise further
issues regarding whether the College’s decisions were carried out in
accordance with the purpose of the Chiropractic Act. The Act ultimately
governs all of the College’s duties and activities, including those related
to complaint investigation decisions, oversight decisions, recusal and
evidence-handling decisions, and informal report handling decisions. This
section turns to a purposive interpretation of the Act and a discussion of
whether the College’s interpretation of its duties and abilities under the Act
were in accord with the Act’s ultimate purpose as it relates to the public
interest.
i.

Purposive interpretation of the NS Chiropractic Act: The public
interest and the avoidance of  onflicts among governing members
The accepted starting point for interpreting statutes is the modern approach
set out by E. A. Driedger and adopted in Rizzo & Rizzo Shoes:
Today there is only one principle or approach, namely, the words of an
Act are to be read in their entire context and in their grammatical and
ordinary sense harmoniously with the scheme of the Act, the object of
the Act, and the intention of Parliament.81

The decisions of the College were based in the College’s understanding
of the text of the Act. Those same decisions, however, also appear to have
led to significant conflicts within the complaint process. A purposive
reading of the Act leads to the conclusion that the College’s interpretation,
one that allows for extensive conflicts within the regulator, cannot be in
accordance with the Act’s purpose of protecting and serving the public
interest.

81.

Rizzo & Rizzo Shoes Ltd (Re), [1998] 1 SCR 27 at para 21, 36 OR (3d) 418 [Rizzo].
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The object of the Act
The Chiropractic Act, like most health professions legislation, has a
written purpose that explicitly focuses on the public interest: as previously
mentioned, section 4(3) of the Act states that the objects of the Act exist “[i]
n order that the public interest may be served and protected.”82 Regulation
of chiropractors in a manner that serves the public interest is evidently the
central purpose of the Act, and all parts of the legislative scheme should be
read with this central goal in mind.
The scheme of the Act
The public interest is not defined within the Chiropractic Act or
Regulations. However, several parts of the scheme outline practices that
serve to reduce the potential for conflicts of interest, which suggests that a
consideration of conflicts is an important aspect of considering the public
interest. The relevant aspects of the legislative scheme include the creation
of multiple branches of the College which are given separate governance
functions, as well as a regulation restricting chiropractors from engaging
in conflicted business practices.83 These will be discussed in more detail
shortly, within the context of the Act’s legislative history. These aspects
of the scheme illustrate that the need for conflict avoidance is written into
the scheme of the Act, denoting that conflict avoidance is connected to the
central purpose that the Act exists to enable: serving and protecting the
public interest.
The intention of the Legislature
The Nova Scotia Legislature’s concern with conflicts of interest in the
regulation of chiropractic is made clear by a set of 1999 legislative
amendments, the preceding debates regarding the amendments, and the
most recent guidance document created by the provincial government
to provide information on the process of granting new professions selfregulating status. All of these factors support an understanding that
the Legislature intended for conflicts to be prevented in the College’s
regulatory functions.
The 1999 amendments to the Act and Regulations specifically
addressed conflicts of interest within the College and among registrants.
The Act was amended to create two bodies within the regulator: a Board,
charged with functions related to regulating registrants, and a Council,
charged with functions relating to the development of the profession
82.
83.

Chiropractic Act, supra note 21, s 4(3).
Ibid, ss 6(1), 6(2), 89, 90; NS Reg 130/2001, s 32 [NS Reg 130/2001].
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itself. Essentially, the amendment served to separate roles and interests
within the College that might otherwise conflict (i.e. those of professional
promotion versus those of professional oversight). The amendments to the
Regulations added a conflict of interest clause prohibiting chiropractors
from having professional corporations that engaged in any conflicts of
interest or unethical practices.84 This served to ensure that chiropractors
would not engage in unethical or conflicted practices through their
businesses, in addition to not engaging in these practices personally.
The debates recorded in Hansard further illustrate that the
Legislature’s purpose in enacting the 1999 amendments was to prevent
conflicts of interest within the College and among practising registrants.
Members in the debates state that the Act’s amendments are intended to
address conflicts of interest and confusion of roles within the regulator
by separating the functions of professional regulation from those of
professional promotion.85 There is also an explanation that this separation
is important for public confidence and for the protection of people who
use regulated health services.86 The debates additionally mention that the
Regulations amendments are intended to address conflicts and “would
ensure that practitioners are not inappropriately shielded against the
liability claims of patients.”87
Of further note is that the debates make specific reference to past
advertising representations by chiropractors purporting to treat cancer
with chiropractic (a claim that, like childhood conditions representations,
lacks supporting scientific evidence).88 These advertisements are described
as being “morally wrong and unethical,” but the debate speaker explains
that “we don’t see that sort of thing anymore,” and that the profession
has “truly come together” since the time these advertisements had been
published.89 Taken together, the statements from the debates support the
idea that the Legislature intended for chiropractors to avoid conflicts of
interest in their regulatory and clinical practices, and that additionally, the
Legislature had a specific expectation that chiropractors would not engage
in misleading advertising about health conditions.
84. NS Reg 130/2001, supra note 83.
85. See Nova Scotia, Legislative Assembly, Hansard, 58th Leg, 2nd Sess (16 November 1999) at
2134 (Hon J Muir).
86. See Nova Scotia, Legislative Assembly, Hansard, 58th Leg, 2nd Sess (19 November 1999) at
2408 (Hon Dr J Smith).
87. Muir, supra note 85 at 2134.
88. See e.g. Cancer Research UK, “Chiropractic” (18 Jan 2019), online: <www.cancerresearchuk.
org/> [perma.cc/K8TE-LAVC].
89. Nova Scotia, Legislative Assembly, Hansard, 58th Leg, 2nd Sess (16 November 1999) at 2140
(Hon Dr J Smith).
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In addition to past amendments and debates concerning the
Chiropractic Act, more recent actions from the provincial government
indicate continued concern about conflicts of interest within health
professions regulators. A 2016 department guide on self-regulation,
intended for use by “staff responsible for examining proposals for new
or amended legislation respecting self-regulated professions” states that
“[p]ersons with personal or professional conflicts of interest should be
expressly prohibited from appointment as public representatives”90 who
would sit on the Board alongside elected chiropractic professionals. This
is consistent with a legislative intention that anyone carrying out duties
within the College should not be in a position of conflict when carrying
out those duties.
The legislative scheme of the Chiropractic Act does not contain a
definition of a conflict of interest. In the absence of any specific definition
within the governing statute, the common law conceptions described earlier
in this paper would apply to the decisions of anyone working within the
College and would guide a determination of whether a particular situation
within the College constitutes a conflict.
ii. The College’s decisions in light of a purposive reading of the Act:
Conflicts and potential conflicts arising from decisions
(a) Investigative conflicts and recusal issues
With the exception of the Investigative Committee Chairs, it is unclear
which College staff participated in investigating each complaint.
However, many governing members of the College were implicated in the
complaints, and the College made no mention of having enlisted outside,
independent actors in the complaint-handling process. Registrants judging
their own complaints would be a direct conflict of interest, one which
the Chiropractic Act does not explicitly authorize, and which would run
contrary to the Legislature’s interest in conflict avoidance. If no additional
parties replaced the Board or Investigative Committee members in
handling the complaints, this would effectively have left staff with two
possibilities. One is that the staff whose websites were complained against
could each recuse themselves from any individual complaint made against
their website. This would leave members to potentially investigate and
judge complaints about the same subject matter as their own reported
or complained-against advertising. The other option is that all of the
90. See Nova Scotia, Advisory Committee on Self-Regulation, “Self-Regulation in Nova Scotia: A
Guide for Nova Scotia Government Departments” (Nova Scotia: ACSR, 2016) at 15, online (pdf): Gov
NS <novascotia.ca/> [perma.cc/U4SD-45J9].
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complained-against or reported staff could all recuse themselves from
investigating every complaint that was similar or related to their own case.
This would potentially leave only a small minority of peers to investigate
and judge all of the complaints.
Based on the signatures visible on the complaint decisions, it
appears that there were at least some individual complaint recusals. One
Investigative Committee Chair was the signatory of all complaints except
for the complaint against her own website.91 Her website’s complaint was
instead signed by a second Investigative Committee Chair.92 However,
both of the Investigative Committee Chairs were the signatories of
complaint decisions involving the same subject matter as the complaint
made against one of their websites, and the reports made against both of
their websites. This indicates that the Chairs did not recuse themselves
from all complaints related to their own website’s complaint or report.
Based on this, it appears that the College, at least to some extent, chose
the first recusal option, that of individual recusals, rather than the second
option, that of collective recusals from all similar or related complaints.
This choice raises conflict of interest concerns, despite members
apparently having recused themselves from investigating their own
complaints directly. Individual recusals would result in members
investigating whether statements about childhood conditions may constitute
grounds for misconduct—despite the fact that their own advertising
contained such statements. It could be argued that because not all of the
advertising statements were identical, it may have been reasonable for
members to judge one another’s cases, as long as they did not judge their
own advertisement. However, all of the advertising had a common theme
(childhood conditions), and the text across advertisements frequently
contained much of the same vocabulary and phrasing and referenced many
of the same ailments. Due to the similarities shared by the advertisements,
a finding of misconduct against a fellow recused practitioner would most
likely have the practical effect of setting a precedent for misconduct
against the practitioner reviewing the complaint. Since misconduct
can have implications on one’s professional reputation and ability to
practice, any party potentially facing a misconduct investigation would
presumably have a personal interest in the matter, particularly a financial
one, as reputation and practicing status affect one’s financial viability as a

91.
92.

See NSCC Complaint Decisions, supra note 63.
See NSCC, Cover Letter and Decision 4.6.75 [unpublished].
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professional. Such an interest would likely give rise to a financial conflict
resulting in a presumption of bias.93
This interest is most clearly applicable to the Chair whose website was
formally complained against, and who in turn investigated other formal
complaints. However, it is also a concern with respect to the Investigative
Committee Chair whose website was only informally reported. If the
second Chair was judging complaints similar to their own report, then the
fact that the second Chair had engaged in similar practices, coupled with
the potential risk of being reported again for past or future advertising,
could have a reputational impact on the second Chair if they were to find
that the first Chair’s similar advertising constituted misconduct. In both
cases, there would be a conflict grounded in the practitioners’ professional
interest in their advertising practices.
(b) Oversight conflicts and lack of recusals
In addition to the issue of conflicts affecting members in complainthandling positions, there was also a more fundamental issue of conflicts
affecting members in supervisory positions. The Board members and
Board Chair were the parties who chose the members of their own
Disciplinary Committees, which in turn handled the complaints. This
means that even if all of the complained-against parties on the Committees
had recused themselves from their investigative or adjudicative positions
in all cases (including all complaints on the same subject matter as their
own complaints), the Board still oversaw the process that the complainthandlers undertook, having also personally appointed these parties to
undertake the process. The Board members and Chair having an oversight
position with respect to these same complaints would create an additional
conflict of interest in the complaint process, by way of these parties having
a pecuniary interest in their own complained-against website content. As
discussed previously, this is a recognized form of administrative conflict
at common law. Since there was no evidence offered by the College that
the Board members affected by the complaints were not involved in their
ordinary function of overseeing the process, it appears that this conflict
was in play when the complaints were handled.
(c) Evidence handling issues
When a complaint is received by a regulatory College, it is normally
forwarded to the registrant to provide an opportunity to respond before the
complaint is reviewed. Registrants made responses to the College in April,

93.

See Blake, supra note 29 at 121.
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a number of weeks before the College issued its decisions in June and
July.94 In many cases, respondents removed material from their websites
before the review, having been notified that the material might contravene
College policy. That is, staff within the College had notified respondents
about the online material before the Investigative Committee reviewed the
material, apparently without anyone in the College taking any measures to
retain the original material as evidence before it could be taken down. It is
unclear which members of the College were responsible for these actions.
However, the fact that a majority of governing members had connections
to the complaints raises the possibility that the governing members’
involvement in the matter influenced the decision not to secure the online
material prior to review, which in turn resulted in a determination that
there was insufficient evidence for a finding of professional misconduct.
Decisions to notify parties of a complaint against them, and of when
and how to gather evidence within a complaint process, are administrative
actions that appear to attract a significant duty of fairness, given their
importance for professionals and their implications for the public. The
fact that so many registrants who were affected by the complaints may
potentially have been involved in these initial administrative actions
raises the possibility of conflicts in these administrative decision-making
processes. The particular concern in this situation is that registrants could
notify other registrants about each complaint, including some of the
direct evidence to be relied on (by way of the complaint forms requiring
a description of all relevant information), in a situation in which many of
the defendant registrants might have direct control over that evidence (by
way of the ability to edit their own complained-against websites). This
could have a bearing on availability of evidence to be considered, which
could in turn have a significant impact on the outcome of the decision.
An appearance of a conflict, or possibly an actual conflict, could have
resulted from potential decision-makers in the complaint process having
the ability to notify one another of the online evidence to be used against
them, and then being given the time and ability to alter or destroy that
evidence before it was reviewed.
(d) Initial decline to forward concerns for investigation or to give
reasons
In the case of the informal reports, only one governing member of the
College (the Registrar) had a formal ability to make a decision about
whether to pursue the reports as complaints (one which would seem to
94.

See NSCC Decisions, supra note 63.
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attract a high standard of procedural fairness). The Registrar was not
named or otherwise connected to any of the informal reports and did not
have any apparent connection to the matters involved. To this extent, there
was no apparent dual role-based conflict of interest, as the Registrar would
have only been in an administrative role, and not a defendant role, if the
reports were pursued as complaints.
However, an indirect conflict could have arisen from the Registrar’s
own administrative position relative to those of direct peers who were
named in the reports. The Registrar, like other registrant Board members,
is elected by a body of peers and may potentially serve for several terms
at a time. If the Registrar (or any elected Board member) has an interest in
maintaining their position (for example, for reasons related to professional
reputation), this would potentially conflict with a decision to take regulatory
action against other members of the Board, or against a large number of
non-governing registrants of the College. Given that approximately 40%
of province’s practitioners were named in the informal reports, a decision
to take action on the reports could significantly undermine the probability
of later re-election (and perhaps cause more general reputational damage
in the eyes of one’s peers). This would constitute a personal interest, and
potentially a financial one, as reputational stakes can impact one’s career.
Both of these interests would also form the basis of an administrative
conflict as described earlier.
In addition to this, one party who was named in the informal reports
was the current President of the College, and another party was a past
President. Although the President is not part of the Board, the position
of President is a highly senior position within the College. Seniority has
been recognized as a source of bias where it may influence the regulatory
decisions of peers within a self-regulating body, specifically where a senior
professional has a known interest in the outcome of a regulatory decision.
In a Manitoba Queen’s Bench case that resulted in this determination, bias
was found by way of interested senior professionals who were part of the
formal decision-making process, as well as by way of an interested senior
professional who was not part of the decision-making committee but who
later served as a complainant.95 The role of the College President as a
potential defendant to one of the informal reports may be analogous to the
role of the senior official who acted as a complainant: in both situations, a
named senior professional’s potential interest in the case may put pressure
or influence on a peer who is charged with making an independent decision
about the case. This issue raises a potential concern about an appearance
95.

See Fong v Winnipeg Regional Health Authority, 2004 MBQB 182 at para 17.
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of biasing the Registrar, a party to whom the President may be considered
senior in a professional context, despite the President serving in a separate
branch of the College.
3. Conclusions on conflicts of interest in self-regulation complaint
processes
The overlapping roles and interests that were at play in the College’s
complaint investigation decisions appear to have involved potential
perceived or real conflicts involving the members who handled the
advertising concerns. Given that conflicts of interest are a potential threat
to the public interest—one that the Legislature appears to have been
concerned with avoiding—the College’s decisions to allow for potential
conflicts are unlikely to accord with the purpose of the legislation.
In addition to the Legislature’s concern with conflict avoidance,
there is a further reason why the Legislature could not have realistically
intended for the College to interpret its powers in a way that would
allow for conflicts to occur: such an interpretation would undermine the
College’s own mandate. In health professions conflicts, one of the interests
at the root of the conflict is the public interest, and the public interest is
an express part of the statutory mandate of the regulator. Because of this,
a conflicting interest that undermines the public interest would effectively
frustrate the College’s ability to carry out its statutory mandate. It is a
recognized principle of procedural fairness that an administrative decisionmaker “may not thwart the intention of the stature by failing to carry out
the statutory mandate.”96 Interpreting the Chiropractic Act’s legislative
scheme in a way that allows for the purpose of serving the public interest
to be thwarted by conflicted interests would be an absurd result: if this
approach were correct, then the legislation would allow for its own purpose
to be defeated. The presumption against absurdity in accepted statutory
interpretation would lead to the conclusion that the legislature could not
have intended that the College should read its power in this way.97
There are several alternative actions the College could have taken
to address the advertising concerns in a way that would be more in line
with its statutory purpose and its need to prevent and mitigate conflicts of
interest. These options include requesting the assistance of an independent
investigator, disclosing the possibility of conflicts among members in
96. See Blake, supra note 29 at 111, citing Greenisle Environmental Inc v Prince Edward Island,
[2005] 248 Nfld & PEIR 39, 2005 PESCTD 33 at para 42.
97. See e.g. Ruth Sullivan, Driedger on the Construction of Statutes, 3rd ed (Toronto: Butterworths,
1994) at 88 (discussing the presumption against absurdity); see also Rizzo, supra note 81 at para 27
(endorsing Sullivan’s view on the presumption against absurdity).

370 The Dalhousie Law Journal

advance of the advertising concerns being handled, and having any reported
or complained-against College members step down from their complainthandling or oversight positions (whether temporarily or permanently).98
The College of Chiropractors of British Columbia did all of these things
when one of their Board and complaint inquiry members faced concerns
over anti-vaccine content that he had posted online in 2018. The College’s
response was to allow the member to resign from his College positions. The
College then sought an independent investigator to look into the concerns,
rather than having College members handle the concerns directly.99 This
kind of response can allow a regulator to exercise its mandate, including its
complaint and discipline functions, while distancing defendant members
from having control over or involvement in the complaint process in a way
that might create a conflict of interest.
While the alternative courses of action available to the College may
appear straightforward (in that another regulator was able to act on them
in a recent case), the current lack of external guidance available to College
members who may face conflicts of interest, combined with the number
of overlapping roles and obligations among members, may make for an
uphill battle for College members who may wish to organize alternative
courses of action when potential conflicts arise. It should be acknowledged
that in many cases, a governing member of a College who faces a conflict
may be in a very difficult situation because of their position relative to
other College members.
An Investigative Committee Chair, for example, may understandably
be reluctant to thoroughly investigate a Board Chair, given that the
Board Chair is responsible for appointing and removing Committee
Chairs.100 A Board member may be reluctant to take disciplinary action
against a senior College member, such as a president, or against peer
Board members, particularly if this would require a minority of Board
members to take action against a majority of their peers. Any governing
member may be wary of taking action on complaints that might implicate
a large percentage of a province’s registrants, as this could undermine a
governing member’s chances of re-election to the College. Permitting
dual roles of practice and governance can put many actors in these
challenging and conflicted positions, perhaps suddenly and unexpectedly.
Without external guidance on how to handle these potential conflicts, this
98. Chiropractic Act, supra note 21, s 42 (power to employ assistance in investigating any
disciplinary matter).
99. See Lindsay Health Claims, supra note 4.
100. See Board Regulations, supra note 22, ss 7.1, 7.5.
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situation may discourage investigatory and disciplinary actions, by pitting
both professional interests and institutional hierarchy against the need
to regulate professional conduct. If the possibility of seeing disciplinary
action taken against registrants in favour of the public interest may also
raise the possibility of damage to one’s professional, social, or institutional
position, actors within the College will have less of a realistic chance of
working in the public interest.
The fact that College members may face challenging circumstances in
addressing administrative conflicts of interest does not absolve the College
of responsibility in properly carrying out its mandate. However, given
the extent and potential prevalence and repeat nature of administrative
conflicts within the regulator, further intervention from the Legislature in
the form of more specific guidance could help to clarify to members that
conflicts should be avoided, and also to outline which procedures College
members should undertake to reduce conflicts. This clarification could
take the form of specific guidance for regulators that may face conflict
issues. More fundamentally, clarification could be supported by way of
reforms to the legislation itself.
Part III
Health professions governance has been undergoing substantial change
in many jurisdictions within the last several decades, with increasing
layers of independent oversight being added into regulatory schemes.
This section surveys recent and proposed regulatory reforms within health
professions regulators, both outside and within Canada, and evaluates
the extent to which these reforms may address conflicts of interest within
health professions regulators.
1. International examples of reforms to health professions regulation
a. UK: Repeal of self-regulation, replacement with professional
regulation
The reforms undertaken in the United Kingdom with respect to the medical
profession are probably the most radical reforms discussed in this section.
The reform process began in the early 2000s, when a physician who was
allowed to keep practising in the face of professional complaints went on to
be found responsible for killing more than 200 patients. A national scandal
ensued, with heavy public criticism that the medical profession’s regulator,
the General Medical Council (GMC), had been overly self-interested and
protective of practitioner interests in its operations. Following this, the
GMC was significantly reformed. Two of the biggest changes to the GMC
itself were altering the council’s membership to 50% lay membership,
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rather than a professional majority, and having government-appointments
of professional members, rather than peer-based elections.101 Additionally,
a new independent body was created to oversee the GMC and other
health professions regulators. This new body, the Professional Standards
Authority for Health and Social Care (originally called the Council for
the Regulation of Healthcare Professionals),102 has several main functions:
reviewing regulators’ final disciplinary decisions, conducting performance
reviews of regulators, and reviewing council appointment processes.103
This system of oversight functions has effectively changed the UK model
from a self-regulation model to a model of professional regulation by an
external body.
Although the initial reforms have now been in place for more than 15
years, there is limited research evaluating their full effects. Allegations of
the GMC catering to the interests of practitioners appear to have waned
(potentially indicating a positive change), but some research has found
potential negative effects of the new GMC reforms on practitioners
themselves. In particular, there are claims that the GMC may now be
overly punitive toward doctors.104 However, there are some indications that
overall public trust in UK health professions and professional regulation is
favourable,105 and the reforms do not appear to have had a negative impact
on the regulatory system’s performance. The strategies of moving certain
regulatory functions to an independent body, increasing lay membership
in regulatory bodies, and making professional membership for regulators
appointment-based, appear to be promising structural changes in terms of
their potential for building the public interest into the regulatory system to
a greater degree. These strategies may be particularly relevant in Canada
because these ideas already have support from some Canadian health
professionals, as will be discussed shortly.

101. See General Medical Council, “Our History,” online: GMC <www.gmc-uk.org/> [https://perma.
cc/YL23-KJM3].
102. See Patrick Butler, “National Body to Oversee Healthcare Professionals” (9 August 2001),
online: The Guardian <www.theguardian.com/> [perma.cc/8PMF-BYZT].
103. See United Kingdom Professional Standards Authority, Our Work with Regulators, online:
<www.professionalstandards.org.uk/> [perma.cc/T7WF-M6MS].
104. See United Kingdom, Civitas Doctor’s Policy Research Group, The General Medical Council:
Fit to Practise? (London: Civitas, 2014) (Hilarie Williams, Christoph Lees & Magnus Boyd), online
(pdf): Civitas <www.civitas.org.uk/> [perma.cc/WT93-QFY6].
105. See UK, Nursing and Midwifery Council, Building Trust and Confidence: What our Audiences
Say about the Key to Better, Safer Care (London: NMC, 2019) at 4, online (pdf): <www.nmc.org.
uk/> [https://perma.cc/83FT-NV9F]; General Medical Council, Promoting and Maintaining Public
Confidence in the Medical Profession: Full Research Report (GMC, 2019) at 19, online (pdf): <www.
gmc-uk.org/> [https://perma.cc/3C9X-VJ6T].
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b. Australia: Setting specific standards using a separate authority  
Australia’s approach to regulatory standard-setting is notable for its
specificity. Australian health professions are regulated nationally, and
in 2010, the National Registration and Accreditation Scheme came into
force, effectively standardizing the manner in which health professions
are regulated. The Australian Health Practitioner Regulation Agency
(AHPRA) was charged with working alongside each individual
professional regulator (called a Board) to implement the standardized
legislation. Importantly, AHPRA is independent from the regulators, and it
has issued its own guidelines that the regulators are expected to follow. In
some cases, the guidelines are highly specific, as in the case of AHPRA’s
acceptable evidence guideline.106
These guidelines are notable for their relative objectivity, as no single
profession has control over their creation. This may potentially prevent
professionals from crafting standards in their own interest. The guidelines
are also highly specific and contain numerous concrete examples for
acceptable and unacceptable conduct, which may help to prevent
regulators from making arbitrary or self-interested decisions in cases
where the guidelines would apply. The existence of independently created
guidelines is not a be-all, end-all improvement to regulation, however. For
example, although the acceptable evidence guideline targets the accuracy
of advertising claims, research has found that inaccurate advertising is
still common in Australia, and there have been calls for further reforms to
the enforcement aspects of Australia’s regulatory framework to improve
compliance.107
Despite these limitations, independently created guidelines for
regulators can potentially be a useful tool in other jurisdictions, including
Canada. To better ensure compliance, guidelines could be clearly labelled
as formal standards (that is, labelling them as standards to denote that they
are mandatory, rather than guidelines which may be treated as permissive).
At least one Canadian regulator appears to agree with the approach of
independently-created standards: the College of Chiropractors of British
Columbia has directly adopted the AHPRA evidence guideline.108 Given
that professions are regulated provincially and not nationally in Canada,
106. See Australian Health Practitioner Regulation Agency, Factors for Assessing if Evidence is
Acceptable (10 August 2019), online: AHRPA <www.ahpra.gov.au/> [perma.cc/56TQ-T3V2].
107. See Ian Freckleton, “Misplaced Hope: Misleading Health Service Practitioner Representations
and Consumer Protection” (2012) 20:1 J L & Med 7 at 7, online: ProQuest <search.proquest.com/>
[perma.cc/MP4L-2WM7].
108. CCBC, “College of Chiropractors of British Columbia Professional Conduct Handbook” (30
November 2017) at 50, online (pdf): CCBC <www.chirobc.com/> [perma.cc/J6R3-KAZ2].
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provincial arms-length regulatory bodies could be created to help set fair
and specific professional standards for regulators to follow.
2. Canada: Themes from current and proposed reforms  
a.

Increased independent oversight of regulators

i. Creation of a separate oversight body, changes to scope of powers
Perhaps the most major recent proposals for regulatory reform in Canada
are those that came out of British Columbia in late 2018. Following a
great deal of public concern over the practices of the College of Dental
Surgeons of British Columbia, which largely revolved around allegations
of professional self-interest similar to those seen in the UK,109 the
provincial government commissioned an inquiry led by UK-based
regulation expert Harry Cayton. The final report from the inquiry, called
the “Cayton Report,” contained sweeping recommendations for a new
regulatory structure for health professionals. A primary recommendation
was for the province to create an independent oversight body above all
health professions, and to transfer certain functions from the Colleges to
that independent body. The body would have similar functions to the UK’s
independent regulator, taking on the tasks of disciplinary decision reviews,
appointment oversight, College performance reviews, and investigations.
However, the responsibilities of professional standards creation, licensing,
and complaint investigation would remain with the Colleges.110 Health
professionals, research experts, and members of the public have expressed
support for more independent oversight in the form of a separate governing
body, with the rationale being that the body could serve as a check against
potential professional self-interest and reduce conflicts within health
regulators.111
ii. Separation of bodies and functions
The Cayton Report noted that “Separation of investigation from
adjudication is a common principle of law which currently does not apply
under the [current Health Professions Act of British Columbia].”112 This
109. See Bethany Lindsay, “How BC’s System for Regulating Health-care Workers is Failing
Patients” (13 April 2019), online: CBC <www.cbc.ca/> [perma.cc/DNN5-RN53].
110. See Canada, The Professional Standards Authority for Health and Social Care, An Inquiry into
the Performance of the College of Dental Surgeons of British Columbia and the Health Professions
Act (London, UK: Professional Standards Authority, 2018) (Harry Cayton) at 91, online (pdf):
Government of British Columbia <www2.gov.bc.ca/> [perma.cc/3Z5S-D36P].
111. See e.g. Paul Bendetti & Wayne MacPhail, “Calls Grow for Outside Regulation of Chiropractors”
Globe and Mail (30 December 2018), online: <www.theglobeandmail.com/> [perma.cc/3N47ZANG].
112. See Cayton, supra note 110 at 87.
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lack of separation was viewed as a factor in the creation of regulatory
conflicts of interest. In his proposal to create an independent and separate
professional oversight body, Cayton recommended that a new body should
be responsible for complaint inquiries and disciplinary functions, as this
would “create a proper independence from the licencing and investigatory
functions of the colleges and remove conflicts of interest from the
membership of the committees and panels.”113
This step of separation between the investigation stage (largely
conducted by the College) and the adjudication stage (conducted by a
separate adjudication body) would make it impossible for the same party to
have any immediate influence over both the investigation and adjudication
of a complaint against them. One problem that may remain in such a system
is defendants potentially influencing their own complaint investigations, if
the power to investigate still remains with actively practising members of
Colleges. However, moving both investigative and adjudicative functions
to the new body would replicate the problem of a lack of separation. As a
result, leaving the investigative power with the College may be justified
based on this procedural concern, while still allowing for the benefit of
adjudication through a more independent body.
iii. Changing accountability structures
Current structures of support and accountability in self-regulating bodies
can create problematic incentives for members. In his study of selfregulating bodies’ current roles, Robert Mysicka notes that “self-regulators
derive a sizable portion of their support from current members and can be
driven more by the immediate interests of such members instead of the
broader interests of the public.”114 This support may be in part collegial,
but it is also structural, in the form of member elections, a process in which
all professionals can participate as voters.
Many professionals themselves are concerned about regulatory
conflicts of interest and support the idea of a change away from peer-based
selection of governing members. For example, a 2018 survey conducted
by the College of Chiropractors of Ontario found that a majority of the
College’s own surveyed members felt that the College’s provisions did
not address conflict of interest concerns sufficiently to allow the College
to regulate in the public interest.115 A separate 2018 regulatory conference
113. Ibid at 86-87.
114. Robert Mysicka, “Who Watches the Watchmen? The Role of the Self-Regulator” (Toronto: CD
Howe Institute, 2014) (CD Howe Institute Commentary 416) at 3, online: SSRN <papers.ssrn.com/>
[https://perma.cc/JBL8-EENE].
115. See College of Chiropractors of Ontario, “Conflict of Interest Considerations and Request for
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survey found that 92% of surveyed attendees supported merit-based
selection of regulators, instead of election-based selection.116 The College of
Nurses of Ontario is taking direct action on this issue, with plans to change
its governance structure to an appointment-based membership system
that is focused around competencies, rather than peer-based elections.117
An appointment-based structure for professional members would help to
remove pressure from regulators to act in favour of their peers’ interests
when professional and public interests conflict, as there would not be a
risk of peer reprisal by way of removal from one’s regulatory post.
In addition to considering professional membership in regulatory
governance, public membership is also an important aspect of a regulator’s
functions. Currently, many Canadian regulators require only a small
minority of decision-makers to be non-professionals. Although there is
a reasonable rationale that professional regulators are needed to evaluate
complaints from an expert perspective, public members can bring an
added degree of independence to the process. If too few investigators or
adjudicators are non-professionals, their views can potentially be crowded
out by a professional majority. As noted above, the UK’s reforms involved
increasing lay representation on the GMC to 50% of the membership. In
Canada, some regulators are now taking similar steps. The College of
Dental Surgeons of British Columbia has increased its Board’s public
membership through appointments by the province’s Minister of Health,
and the College of Nurses of Ontario in Canada now intends to do the
same with its own governance Board.118 This suggests that the use of more
lay membership in governance to bolster independent decision-making
holds at least some support and potential within Canada.
b. Collaborative regulation
Many professional activities can fall within the purview of multiple
regulators. Practitioners who operate multidisciplinary clinics or engage
in shared marketing, for example, may be responsible for adhering to
clinic and marketing standards overseen by multiple regulatory Colleges,
as well as competition law standards overseen by the Competition Bureau.
This means that when issues arise from professional activities, there are
Feedback” (29 October 2018) at 291, online (Council Public Package): CCO <www.cco.on.ca/>.
116. See Julie Maciura, “92%” (October 2018), online (newsletter): SML Law <www.sml-law.com/>
[perma.cc/6C4S-39YD].
117. See College of Nurses of Ontario, “Governance Vision 2020,” online: CNO <www.cno.org/>
[perma.cc/ZRE5-JC5Y].
118. Ibid; British Columbia Ministry of Health, News Release, “Board Appointments Help Dental
College Put Public First” (8 March 2018), online: Gov BC <news.gov.bc.ca/> [perma.cc/6DSSAM9Y].
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sometimes multiple regulators that may take action, whether separately
or in collaboration with one another. Encouraging input from multiple
regulators, where possible, may reduce the likelihood of self-regulating
bodies encountering conflicts of interest in their activities.
Collaboration could occur between regulatory Colleges and
independent bodies like the Competition Bureau or other consumer
protection bodies. Given that many of the same professional activities
might fall within the oversight of self-regulators and the Competition
Bureau, Mysicka proposes that “Canadian governments can further
enhance oversight by consulting with the Competition Bureau and
consumer advocacy groups when administering or surveying selfregulatory powers.”119 Increased input from bodies like the Bureau
may help to put greater emphasis on consumer protection, rather than
professional interests, when governments are reviewing self-regulatory
powers or when self-regulatory bodies are creating their own policies or
reviewing enforcement practices.120
Collaboration could also occur between different health professions’
regulatory Colleges. Two provinces, Nova Scotia and Ontario, have
already created legislation to support collaborative regulation among
health professions, and in general there has been an increased interest
in collaborative health professions regulation in Canada.121 Current
legislation in Nova Scotia allows for several actions that may help to
avoid conflicts in complaint processes, such as the ability for different
health professions to investigate on one another’s behalf, and the ability
for professions to assign investigative tasks to appointed investigative
professionals (rather than the elected professionals of a College).122
Professional Colleges can also develop collaborative policies, tools and
resources, and communicate with government and other bodies regarding
improvements to regulation,123 which could help with developing policies
and practices that prevent investigative or disciplinary conflicts.
Nova Scotia’s legislation is permissive in nature; professions are not
required to collaborate but may do so voluntarily.124 While this legislation
may work well for enabling professional autonomy and initiatives, it may
be justifiable to treat the prevention of conflicts as an exceptional situation
119. Mysicka, supra note 114 at 4.
120. Ibid at 20-21.
121. See William Lahey & Katherine Fierlbeck, “Legislating Collaborative Self-regulation in Canada:
A Comparative Policy Analysis” (2016) 30:2 J Interprof Care 211.
122. Regulated Health Professions Network Act, SNS 2012, c 48, ss 19(5)(a), (e).
123. Ibid, ss 16(3)(b), (f).
124. See Lahey & Fierlbeck, supra note 121.
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in which collaboration should be made mandatory by government, as the
public interest arguably outweighs an interest in professional autonomy.
For similar reasons, other Canadian jurisdictions without collaborative
legislation could benefit from creating rules that would require health
professions to collaborate in ways that help to reduce regulatory conflicts
of interest.
3. Conclusion on proposals for reform
Taken together, the proposals and reforms made to health professions selfregulators within and outside Canada would represent a significant overhaul
of the current system. Changes like creating independent oversight and
rule-making bodies, increasing the separation of regulatory functions,
altering College membership composition, and using new processes for
determining who can govern a College all represent a different way of
approaching almost every facet of the current system. Some of these
changes, like changing governance composition, may be simpler to effect
than other changes, like creating entirely new bodies. Each change has
its own set of potential limitations, and little is known about whether one
approach may be the most effective.
However, most of the outlined proposals have been implemented
somewhere, and most have been endorsed by at least some regulators or
their professional members within Canada, without any indication of the
changes being a misstep. More fundamentally, any one of these changes
would decrease the propensity for governing members of Colleges to be
in conflicted positions that may lead to decisions that are harmful to the
public. The more duties, roles, and expectations a professional carries
within the same system, the more likely it is that some of these interests
will conflict. Any change that decreases the number of overlapping
regulatory and professional roles and expectations for health professionals
can help to solve this problem. Regulatory reform for Canadian health
professions is already receiving attention for a variety of reasons, in the
hope of addressing a variety of concerns related to public health, safety,
and trust. Conflicts of interest within self-regulating governance structures
should be included on the list of important considerations that can be
readily targeted by reform.

